Introduction
Most of general equilibrium macroeconomic models are simplied by assuming that consumers and/or rms could be described as a representative agent. That is agents may dier and act dierently, but at equilibrium the sum of their choices is mathematically equivalent to the decision of one individual or many identical individuals. The way that preferences of multiple agents aggregate at equilibrium is a dicult task, and even if each individual preference is modeled by a simple function, it is unlikely that the aggregate utility could be reduced into a simple expression (unless all agents are identical). Heterogeneity of investors is an unavoidable feature that should be taken into account.
The literature on equilibrium risk sharing in complete markets with heterogeneous risk preferences starts with the seminal paper by Dumas [Dum89] , with two agents with heterogeneous risk preferences. Chan and Kogan [CK02] consider an extension of the Wang [Wan96] model, with a continuum of agents with heterogeneous risk aversions.
Yan [Yan10] and Jouini et al. [JN10] stress the impact of relative wealth uctuations on the equilibrium characteristics. Cvitanic, Jouini et al. [CJMN11] were the rst to propose an equilibrium model dealing with three types of heterogeneity: investors may dier in their beliefs, in their level of risk aversion and in their time-preference rate.
They identify the channels through which heterogeneity impacts the dierent equilibrium characteristics. In their model, the aggregate parameters can be written as a risk tolerance weighted average of the individual parameters.
In the meantime, the existence of an equilibrium is not always satised and equilibrium are often stated and studied in a complete market setting. One key point for the existence of equilibrium is that agents agree on the same state price density process (also called pricing kernel), which is the same for all agents. However, if no equilibrium exists, is it still possible to propose a representative utility aggregating the preferences of all investors in the economy?
In this paper, we start from the weaker hypothesis of non arbitrage, and we consider an incomplete market, with given exogenous market parameters. Our aim is to propose a way of describing globally the behavior of heterogeneous agents investing in this market, heterogeneous by their preferences, their weights or sizes. To do this we construct a stochastic utility process corresponding to the aggregate wealth of the economy and to the aggregate pricing kernels. We do not deal with agents interactions, nor equilibrium, neither Pareto optimality: the repartition of the wealth among market investors is given. The global wealth of the whole economy is naturally dened by the aggregation of the wealth of all individuals. The problem consists then in deriving a utility process for which this global wealth is optimal. This is related to a calibration approach, and to do this the progressive framework is well adapted (see [KHM17a] ).
Besides, the progressive approach has also many advantages. First of all, it allows to model the change of the preferences of the investors along time. Indeed, in a dynamic and stochastic environment, the standard notion of utility function is not exible enough to help us to make good choices in the long run. The utility criterion must be adaptative and adjusted to the information ow. Musiela and Zariphopoulou were the rst to suggest to use instead of the classic criterion the concept of progressive dynamic utility, that gives an adaptive way to model possible changes over the time of individual preferences of an agent. Characterization of market-consistent progressive utility has been then studied in a general setting in El Karoui and Mrad [KM13, KM16b] .
Secondly, the theoretical study of progressive utility emphasizes the dependency of the optimal processes with respect to their initial conditions. This dependency and some non linearity eects are illustrated in the example of the valuation of the discount rates.
In the economic modeling, interest rates are determined endogenously at equilibrium, mainly in an economy composed of identical investors (see for example the well known
Vasicek [Vas77] or Cox Ingersoll Ross [CIR85] models). In our framework, the market is incomplete and in place of the traditional (complete) pricing rule, we price the zerocoupon bonds using the indierence pricing rule, based on the marginal indierence pricing. A numerical example is proposed based on an extension of the Vasicek model of the yield curve.
The paper is organized as follow. First we dene in Section 2 the investment universe and we recall the framework and the main properties of market consistent progressive utilities, and the characterization of a consistent utility from its optimal primal and dual processes. Section 3 states the main results about preferences aggregation: from the characteristics of the investors, we construct an aggregate consistent progressive utility process, by aggregating the wealth of each investors and their pricing kernels. To illustrate this theory, we give the example of aggregating power utilities. In particular we show that aggregating power utilities does not lead to a power utility, except if all investors share the same risk aversion. Thus taking a power utility for the representative agent, as it is done in many economic papers, assumes actually a very strong hypothesis of homogeneity of the dierent investors in the economy. Section 4 studies the impact of the heterogeneity of investors, that induces dependency and non-linearity in the valuation of nancial assets. The particular example developed here consists in the valuation of discount rates and the impact of the global wealth on this rates. Some numerics illustrate the impact of the dierent parameters on the yield curve. Technical regularity conditions are postponed in the Appendix.
2 Investment universe and Consistent progressive utility.
The investment universe
Let us consider an incomplete Itô market, dened on a ltered probability space
(Ω, (F t ), P) (satisfying usual condition of completion and right continuity) driven by March 1, 2018 3/31 a n-standard Brownian motion W . As usual, the market is characterized by some exogenous progressive processes: the short rate (r t ) and a n-dimensional risk premium (η t ), satisfying the integrability condition T 0 (r s + |η s | 2 )ds < ∞ for any T . The agent may invest in this nancial market. To be short, we give the mathematical denition of the class of admissible strategies 1 (κ t ), without specifying the risky assets. The incompleteness of the market is expressed by restrictions on the risky portfolios κ t constrained to live in a given progressive vector space R t . To x the idea, if the incompleteness follows only from the fact that the number of assets is less than the dimension n of the Brownian motion, then typically R t = σ t (R n ). For an Itô market, good references are Karatzas, Lehoczky, Shreve [KLS87] or the book of Karatzas and Shreve [KS01] , and in a more general context Kramkov, Schachermayer [KS03] .
To avoid technicalities, we assume throughout the paper that all the processes satisfy the necessary (progressive) measurability and integrability conditions such that the following formal manipulations and statements are meaningful. The following short notations will be used extensively. Let R be a vector subspace of R n . For any x ∈ R n , x R is the orthogonal projection of the vector x onto R and x ⊥ is the orthogonal projection onto R ⊥ .
Denition 2.1 (Admissible portfolio). (i)
The self-nancing dynamics of a wealth process with risky portfolio κ, starting from the initial wealth x > 0, is given by
and
where κ is a progressive n-dimensional vector measuring the volatility vector of the wealth X κ , such that
(ii) A self-nancing strategy (κ t ) is admissible if the portfolio κ lives in a given progressive family of vector spaces (R t ) a.s..
(iii) The set of the wealth processes with admissible (κ t ) (called admissible wealth processes) starting from the initial wealth x is denoted by X (x), and X when the initial wealth is not specied.
The existence of a risk premium η formulates the absence of arbitrage opportunity.
Since from (2.1), the impact of the risk premium on the wealth dynamics only appears through the term κ t .η t for κ t ∈ R t , there is a "minimal" risk premium (η R t ), the projection of η t on the space R t (κ t .η t = κ t .η R t ), to which we refer in the sequel. In the following denition, we are interested in the class of the so-called state price density processes Y ν (taking into account the discount factor) which are also called the pricing kernels. The simplest example of such process is the market state price process Y 0 (ν = 0, Y 0 0 = 1). In particular (X κ t Y 0 t ) is a local martingale, whose volatility (κ t −η R t ) belongs to R t . The martingale property (2.2) can be then expressed in terms of the ratio ( . The dierential decomposition of these three processes is
Interesting discussions on the links between the state price density processes and the admissible market numeraire 1/Y 0 t , also called GOP (growth optimal portfolio) can be found in Geman, El Karoui, Rochet [KGR95] , in Heath, Platen book [PH06] , and in Filipovic, Platen [FP09] . Besides, the state price density processes are also called "pricing kernels" since they are useful for evaluating contingent claims under the historical probability measure P. Not surprisingly, we will focus on them in the application of Section 4 about the valuation of zero-coupon bond and the modeling of the yield curve.
2.2
Consistent progressive utility and their characteristics
The preferences of the agents investing in the nancial market are modeled by consistent progressive utility. The sub-cone of admissible wealth processes X , describing the nancial landscape, is considered in this forward setting as a family of test processes. As in statistical learning, the utility criteria are dynamically adjusted to this given family of test processes, also called the learning set. The time-coherence is then obtained from a dynamic decision criterion adjusted progressively over the time to this set X .
More precisely, a progressive utility U is dened as a family of càdlàg adapted processes (U (t, x), x ∈ R + ) such that P.a.s., for every t ≥ 0, the functions x ∈ R + → U (t, x, ω) are standard utility functions. As usual, a utility function u is a strictly concave, strictly increasing, and non-negative function dened on R + , with continuous marginal utility the derivative u x , satisfying the Inada conditions lim u x (x) = ∞. The risk aversion coecient R A (u) is measured by the ratio
is a key parameter in the optimization problem (see Kramkov [KS99] ). As usual, the dual problem is based on the Fenchel-Legendre convex conjugate transformationũ(y) of a utility function u, whereũ satisesũ(y) = sup x>0 u(x) − yx). In particular,ũ(y) ≥ u(x) − yx and the maximum is attained at u x (x) = y. Under Inada conditions,ũ is twice continuously dierentiable, strictly convex, strictly decreasing, withũ(0 + ) = u(+∞),ũ(+∞) = u(0 + ), a.s..
Moreover, the marginal utility u x is the inverse of the opposite of the marginal conjugate utilityũ y ; that is u −1
x (y) = −ũ y (y);ũ(y) = u −ũ(y) +ũ y (y) y, and u(x) = u u x (x) + x u x (x). Throughout the paper, we adopt the convention of small letters for deterministic utilities and capital letters for stochastic utilities.
Characteristics of the consistent progressive utility
The progressive utilities are adjusted to the learning set X . The satisfaction provided by a test process X κ ∈ X is measured by the dynamic criterion (U (t, X κ t )). Since X is a learning set, there is no satisfaction to invest in the set X , in other words in mean the future is less preferable than the present. From the mathematical point of view, this is equivalent to the supermartingale property of the dynamic preference process (U (t, X κ t )). Moreover, to ensure that the stochastic utility (U (t, x)) is optimally adjusted, we make the additional assumption that the previous supermartingale constraint is binded by some optimal process κ * whose preference criterion (U (t, X κ * t )) is a martingale.
Denition 2.4 (Consistent progressive utility). Let U be a progressive utility with learning set X . (i) The utility U is said to be X -consistent, if for any admissible test process X κ ∈ X , the preference process (U (t, X κ t )) is a non-negative supermartingale. ( ii) The consistent utility U is said to be X -strongly consistent if there exists an optimal process X * := X κ * ∈ X , with κ * t ∈ R t , binding the constraint, in the sense that the optimal preference process (U (t, X * t )) is a martingale.
The value function (U(t, x)) of the classical optimization problem is an example of strongly X -consistent utility, dened from its terminal condition U(T H , x) = u(x) (see [KHM17a] for a general discussion between the forward and the backward viewpoints of utility functions).
The consistency property of the progressive utility U has a natural equivalent for dual progressive utility, as stated in the following proposition (see [KM13] for the proof).
Proposition 2.5. U is a consistent progressive utility with the class X if and only if its Fenchel transform U is consistent with the class Y in the sense that U (t, Y t ) is a submartingale for any Y ∈ Y, and there exists some Y * ∈ Y (called dual optimal process) such that U (t, Y * t ) is a martingale. Moreover, the two optimal processes are related by the main identity U x (t, X * Rogers provides in [Rog03] a unied (and very simple) approach to get very quickly a simple heuristic of the main identity
), that will be at the cornerstone of this paper.
Local characteristics of consistent forward utility
The "global" supermartingale property implied by the consistency condition may be transfered into local conditions on the dierential characteristics of the utility process U. El Karoui and Mrad [KM13] obtained a non linear HJB-SPDE under the general assumption that the utility random eld U is a "regular" Itô random eld with dierential decomposition,
where β(t, x) is the drift random eld and γ(t, x) is the multivariate diusion random eld. The regularity assumption recalled in the Appendix, allows in particular to use the Itô-Ventzel formula and to show that the marginal utility (U x (t, x)) is also an Itô random eld with local characteristics (β x (t, x), γ x (t, x)). We give the main result about the consistency characterization through a HJB contraint:
Theorem 2.6 (Consistency). Let U be a "regular utility" system and (β, γ) its local characteristics. The utility random eld U is strongly consistent with the family of test processes X = {X κ , |κ ∈ R} if and only if (a) and (b) holds :
(i) a) The drift random eld β satises the HJB-constraint, dP × dt.a.s.
(2.5)
The quantity
Ux(t,x) can be interpreted as an "utility risk premium".
admits a strong solution X * , which is an optimal portfolio in the preference sense.
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(ii) In addition, the positive process U x (t, X * t (x)) is the optimal dual state price
(2.7)
The regularity assumptions on U recalled in the Appendix imply that the coecients of the SDEs (2.6) and (2.7) are regular enough to ensure that X * and Y * are monotonic 
Consistent power utility and separability
Power utilities with constant relative risk aversion
1−θ are the standard framework in the economic literature, useful for its simplicity and the easy interpretation of the parameters. In particular, the parameter θ is the relative risk
x (x) = θ. Consistent progressive power utilities U (θ) (t, x) are the product of their initial condi-
t . Despite their stochastic structure, their relative risk aversion coecients are still constants,
is to guarantee the market consistency of dynamics power utility. Since u (θ)
being the stochastic parameters of the semimartingale Z (θ) . Theorem 2.6 characterizes the optimal processes of power progressive utilities.
(y) are linear with respect to their initial conditions, X ( * ,θ) (x) = xX ( * ,θ) and Y ( * ,θ) (x) = yȲ ( * ,θ) , with dynamics
The coecient δ (θ),R t describes how the stochasticity of the utility inuences the investment strategy κ
(ii) The drift of the process (Z (θ) t ) is not free, since the consistency condition (equivalent to the HJB constraint) implies that
, and
The consistent power utilities are completely specied by the volatility (δ
Proof. (i) By Equation (2.6), the volatility of the optimal process X ( * ,θ) t (x) is linear with respect to the initial wealth x, σ ( * ,θ) (t,
). Since the drift is also linear, the optimal process is linear with respect to the initial wealth, X ( * ,θ) (x) = xX ( * ,θ) where the dynamics ofX ( * ,θ) is given by Equation (2.8). The dual process Y ( * ,θ) t (y) is also linear with respect to y, and by Equation (2.7), ϑ ( * ,θ) (t, y) = y δ (θ),⊥ t . Then, the dynamic of (Ȳ ( * ,θ) t ) is given by Equation (2.8).
(ii) By the optimality relation, U (θ)
. This property is equivalent to the HJB constraint on the drift
. The linearity of the dierent processes yields
The drift of Z (θ) depends only of the market parameters (r t , η R t ) and its volatility δ Remark 2.1. Power utilities have also the remarkable property to be the only consistent separable progressive utilities U (t, x) = Z t u(x). The HJB equation (2.5) leads to a contradiction as soon as the functions φ 1 = xu x /u and φ 2 = xu xx /u x are not constant, since the HJB constraint on the drift β(t, x) implies that the time function ρ Z t satises One remarkable feature proved in [KM13] is that properties given in Theorem 2.6 are in fact necessary and sucient conditions to reconstruct a consistent progressive utility from two optimal processes X * et Y * , when theses processes are monotonic with respect to their initial condition. This construction relies on the identity
, using monotonicity and regularity of optimal random elds, and some integrability condition near zero of the initial utility.
Let us consider two increasing monotonic processes X * . (x) ∈ X (x) and Y * . (y) ∈ Y (y), strong regular solutions of the two SDEs
(2.9)
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The dynamics of X * ∈ X is uniquely determined by its diusion coecient σ * ∈ R; the corresponding SDE is denoted SDE R (σ * ). Similarly the dynamics of Y * ∈ Y is uniquely determined by its diusion coecient ϑ * ,⊥ ∈ R ⊥ ; the corresponding SDE is denoted SDE ⊥ (ϑ * ,⊥ ).
We now give sucient conditions on the coecients σ * (t, x) and ϑ * ,⊥ (t, y) which ensure on the one hand the monotonicity of the solutions of Equations (2.9) and the semimartingale decomposition of the random eld X * the inverse ow of X * ; and on the other hand that the random eld V dened by V (t,
is the derivative of a progressive utility U. The sucient regularity conditions we state below are proved in [KM13] .
Technical results
In this presentation we clearly favor the SDE point of view for the processes X * and Y * . This allows us to use the existing results in SDE's theory and provide sucient regularity conditions (K and SDE ⊥ (ϑ * ,⊥ ) dened in (2.9) and assume
(2.10) (i) Then, the dierential equations SDE ⊥ (ϑ * ,⊥ ) and SDE R (σ * ) admit two regular monotonic solutions Y * and X * with dierent regularity. 
The range of the maps x → X * (x) and y → Y * (y) is ]0, +∞[. The inverse X * of X * is a semimartingale, unique monotonic solution of the stochastic PDE, Corollary 2.9. The asymptotic behaviors of X * and Y * are similar and well-controlled in time. The short notation max(Z T (z)) = sup 0≤t≤T Z(t, z) is used in the sequel. More precisely, if Z is one of the two processes X * and Y * , for any T almost surely, for any ε ∈ (0, 1), uniformly on [0, T ], the asymptotic limits in ∞ or 0 are,
(2.12) Sometimes, it is more interesting to consider SDE's solutions as random elds X * (t, x)
or Y * (t, y) with local characteristics φ * (t, x) = σ * (t, X * t (x)) or ψ * (t, y) = ϑ * ,⊥ (t, Y * t (y)). With the random elds point of view, non negativity and monotonicity are not so easy to prove.
Corollary 2.10. Let (X * t (x)) and (Y * t (y)) be two monotonic random elds,
and assume that φ * ∈ K 3,δ loc , and ψ * ∈ K 2,δ loc for δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then, the random elds X * and Y * have the same properties as the processes of Proposition 2.8.
Proof. Using Theorem 5.1 in the Appendix, one deduces that X * (x) ∈ K 3,ε loc and Y * (y) ∈ K 2,ε loc . Then one show exactly as in [KM13] that the inverse ow X * is a regular semimartingale.
Main result concerning the reverse problem
Let us consider two random elds, X * and Y * , solution of the two SDEs (2.9) with coecients satisfying the assumptions (2.10) of Proposition 2.8. Their properties are recalled in Proposition 2.8 and in Corollary 2.9. As denoted previously X * is the inverse process of X * and u is the initial utility.
The main result on the construction of consistent forward utility is obtained in two stages: the rst concerns the properties of the decreasing random eld (U x (t, x) = Y * t (u x (X * t (x)))) and of its primitive as semimartingales; the second concerns the Xconsistency of this forward utility and the optimality of the process X * . Theorem 2.11 (Utility Characterization). Let us assume that the given initial utility u is of class C 3 and u x (x) ∼ x −ζ (ζ < 1) in the neighborhood of x = 0. Under the assumptions and notations of Proposition 2.8, (X * t (x)) and (Y * t (y)) are the unique monotonic solutions of the SDEs (2.9). Then (i) The random eld dened by V * (t, x) = Y * t (u x (X * t (x))) is a semimartingale, integrable in the neighborhood of x = 0, which is the derivative of a progressive utility U (t, x) (V * (t, x) = U x (t, x)) with regular local characteristics (β(t, x), γ(t, x)) with
(2.14)
(ii) By Theorem 2.6, U is strongly consistent with the class X , that is for any X ∈ X , U (t, X t ) is a supermartingale and martingale for X * t .
This result is proved in [KM13] in a SDE point of view, therefore we do not reproduce it here. A similar proof, this time in a random eld point of view, is given in the context of aggregation in Theorem 3.3.
The system (2.14) can be inverted to express the characteristics of optimal processes in terms of progressive utility characteristics.
Corollary 2.12. Since X * and Y * are optimal, their characteristics (φ * (t, x)) and (ψ * (t, y)) are explicit functionals of the progressive utility U and its derivatives as well as of its volatility vectors γ x along the optimal wealth process. So, 
Aggregation of the initial utilities
The global initial wealth x of the economy is the sum of the individual wealths: for each θ, the θ-agent/class starts (at time 0) with a proportion α θ of the initial global wealth
x so that x = α θ x m(dθ). At time 0, the individual preferences u θ are "dilated" into the utilities 1 α θ u θ (α θ x), and the global utility is the function u(x),
The measure m(dθ) can be a discrete nite measure, in this case dierentiability under the integral sign is straightforward. One may also consider measures with density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. Then to ensure the 3 times-dierentiability under the integral sign, locally-domination conditions are necessary: we assume that for any interval I ⊂ R * + there exist integrable functions φ
and for k = 1, 2, 3. In all cases, we can pass to the limits and show lim x→+∞ u x (x) = 0 and lim x→0 u x (x) = +∞. Note that for k = 1, since u θ x is by denition decreasing, it follows that for any
and assume that it is θ-integrable.
Then, from (3.1), the marginal utility u x of the global utility is the sum of the marginal utilities, in the sense that
The same kind of representation holds also for the inverse function of u x , −ũ y , using the correspondence between the derivatives of the utility and its dual
which leads to the remarkable feature that for any θ,ũ y (y) = 1 α θũ θ y (y θ (y)); this relation is the dual version of the α θ -repartition of the initial wealth, x = 1 α θ (α θ x). Observe that the relative risk aversion coecient R r A (u) is a "probabilistic" mixture of the dierent risk aversion coecients,
bounded if the family of individual risk aversion coecients R r A (u θ )(α θ x) is uniformly bounded in θ.
Aggregation of the optimal processes
Up to the time t, the individuals invest optimally in a portfolio X * ,θ (α θ x) with preferences characterized by their consistent progressive utility U θ . It is then natural to dene the global wealth in the economy at any time t, (X * t ), as the weighted sum of the individual wealths (X * ,θ t ),
Motivated by the construction of the initial utility and of its derivative u x (x) =
) as a mixture of individual state price processes, which is still an admissible state price pro-
Now, the problem is formulated as a reverse problem (Section 2.3) based on the increasing aggregate processes, X * t (x) and Y * t (y). The last diculty is to study the regularity of those aggregate processes X * t (x) and Y * t (y) from the regularity of the individual processes X * ,θ t (x) and Y * ,θ t (y). Notice that the aggregation of processes is easier when they are considered as random elds rather as solutions of SDEs. Also, we use the representation of optimal processes given in Corollary 2.10 for the processes X * ,θ , Y * ,θ ,
Any linear combination of portfolios X * ,θ t (α θ x) is an admissible portfolio issued from the linear combination of their initial wealth α θ x. The same property is still true for continuous combination (under some integrability conditions). Then, the aggregate wealth process X * . (x) = X * ,θ . (α θ x)m(dθ) is an admissible portfolio in X (x) and
(3.6) By similar arguments, the aggregate dual process Y * is an admissible one, with more complex dynamics, because of its dependence in u x (x)
Since for any θ, X * ,θ and Y * ,θ are optimal, their characteristics are given in terms of the volatility vectors γ θ of U θ , which yields
The aggregate utility
The goal from now is to show the existence of dynamic utility U generating X * and Y * as optimal processes. As in the previous section, if U exists, then necessarily the master identity U x (t, X * t (x)) = Y * t (u x (x)) has to be satised. The problem has a simple solution in the case of power utilities.
Aggregating power utilities
We come back to the standard example of power utilities and their aggregation, detailed in Paragraph 2.2.2. We assume in this subsection that not only the initial utility functions but all the progressive utilities to be aggregated are power utilities with dierent risk aversion coecient.
By denition the initial utility is a mixture of dilated power utilities
which is no longer a power utility. More generally, all utility processes U (θ) are power utilities with constant relative risk aversion coecient θ (0 < θ < 1). As recalled in
1−θ for some process Z (θ) and the optimal primal and dual processes are linear with respect to their initial conditions.
The characterization of the aggregate optimal processes is easy to obtain from the denition,
Remark that whereas the aggregate wealth X * is a linear process with respect to its initial value x, this not true anymore for the aggregate state price density process Y * .
The construction of a progressive utility with optimal processes (xX * t , Y * t (y)), based on the main identity U x (t, x) = Y * t ( u x ( x X * t )), yields easily to the following characterization.
Proposition 3.1. The marginal utility U x (t, x) is the deterministic aggregation of the power marginal progressive utilities with random repartition of the optimal wealth,
The ratioĀ
is the stochastic ratio of the optimal wealths at time t.
As for the Pareto utility in [ILMM13] , agreggating power utilities provides a family of consistent progressive utilities which is more exible, while beneting from some interesting features of power utilities (such as tractability).
Aggregating general consistent utilities is not as straightforward as for power utilities, and it involves the "reverse problem" techniques detailed previously in Section 2.3.
The general case
The general case will be considered as a reverse problem. Following the results in Section 2.3, some preliminary technical results are needed.
Lemma 3.2. The optimal processes X * ,θ and Y * ,θ are assumed to satisfy the regularity conditions of Theorem 2.11, with the same δ for each θ and with Lipschitz constants C X,θ and C Y,θ satisfying C X,θ m(dθ), C Y,θ m(dθ) < ∞. We also assume that for any interval I ⊂ R * + there exist integrable functions
k (x, θ), ∀x ∈ I and for k = 1, 2, 3. Then, (i) There exists a constant K, such that for any θ and any x, y > 0, E(X * ,θ t (x)) ≤ C X,θ Ktx and E(Y * ,θ t (y)) ≤ C Y,θ Kty. Consequently, the integrals (3.4) and (3.5) are well dened.
(ii) The monotonic random elds X * , dened by (3.6), is ∈ K 3,ε loc for any ε ∈ [0, δ[ and its inverse ow X * is a semimartingale. Moreover
x is of class C 2 (0, ∞), u x ∈ C 2 (0, ∞) and the marginal utility process (ii) Combining Assumptions of this result with Theorem 5.3 leads to X * ,θ ∈ K 3,ε loc and
It follows that φ * (t, x)(= σ * (t, X * t (x))) and ψ * (t, y) (= ϑ * (t, Y * t (y)) are respectively in K 3,ε loc and K 2,ε loc . We then conclude as in Corollary 2.10. Statement (iii) becomes obvious.
These regularity results allow us to consider the problem of consistency of the aggregate utility as a reverse problem as in Theorem 2.11. Theorem 3.3. Under Assumptions of Lemma 3.2, U dened by
is a consistent semimartingale progressive utility. The optimal primal and dual processes are (X * t (x)) and Y * t (u x (x)) = U x (t, X * t (x)) and
(3.9)
Since φ * (t, x) = σ * (t, X * t (x)) and ψ * (t, y) = ϑ * (t, Y * t (y)), it is easy to check the equivalence between the systems (3.9) and (2.14).
Proof. It is a consequence of Theorem 2.11, since X * and Y * satises respectively the SDE (2.6) and (2.7) and the regularity conditions are satised. We produce here the proof in this context of aggregation; the proof being still valid in the general setting of Theorem 2.11. It relies on the identity
(ii) Identifying the drift term, it is also easy to prove that U satises the HJB constraint (2.5). Indeed, using the characterization of σ * ,
It follows, after arranging the terms and identifying with the drift term of dY * ,θ t (y)
and integrating with respect to x gives the HJB constraint. In this work, given the wealth of each class x θ , we get the global wealth of the economy as x = x θ m(dθ). In other words, the α θ are imposed and given by α θ := x θ /x.
In the literature, the approach is rather the opposite: given the global wealth of the economy x, the problem is to nd the fair allocation of the wealth x between the dierent classes such that the allocation is Pareto optimal, that is there are no possible alternative allocations whose realization would cause every class to gain. The Pareto optimal allocation is determined by the initial wealths x * ,θ with x * ,θ m(dθ) = x such that u(x) = u(x * ,θ )m(dθ) = sup{ u(x θ )m(dθ)| x θ ≥ 0 and x θ m(dθ) = x}. One important consequence of Pareto optimality is that the optimal pricing kernel Y * ,θ is the same for all agents. See for example the paper of Bank and Kramkov [BK15] that aggregates utilities parameterized by Pareto weights, for a nite number of investors, or Mrad [KM16a] for a continuum of agents and a general mixture framework. In this work, the initial repartition of the wealth is assumed to be given a priori, without reference to any "optimal allocation". The α θ are xed (at time 0) and correspond to the proportion of the total wealth hold by the θ-class. Therefore the aggregate utility U and the aggregate pricing kernel Y * are not standard, but they are natural candidate for aggregating dierent points of view of several agents, in a context without an equilibrium. It thus allows a richer class of pricing kernel that will add exibility to capture some nancial features, such that the impact of the wealth on the valuation of nancial assets.
We choose to illustrate this methodology in measuring its impact on the yield curve. [Bjo12] and Piazzesi [Pia10] ). The nancial setting only assumes no arbitrage and with an exogenous short term interest rate, in a framework of incomplete market.
Yield curve in incomplete market
In the context of the high illiquidity of the bond market for longer maturities, the nancial evaluation we consider is the marginal utility indierence pricing of zerocoupon bond. The link with the economic discount rate given by the Ramsey rule (in an equilibrium setting) is studied in El Karoui et al. [KHM14, KHM17b] .
Utility indierence pricing
The marginal utility indierence pricing at time t is not based on the "universal " market state price density Y 0 (as in complete market), but on the optimal state price density Y * . (y) of the progressive dual utility U of U (Proposition 2.5). With this new point of view, the price of some derivative ξ T is not given by
, making the price depending on the global wealth x of the economy via the correspondence u x (x) = y. The pricing rule π 0 0 , that is independent of the wealth, will be called market pricing rule.
Dynamic marginal utility indifference pricing By denition, any state price density (Y * t (y)) can be written as Y * t (y) = Y 0 t L * t (y). All the dependencies on the wealth x (or y = u x (x)) is supported by the exponential martingale L * t (y), normalized by its value at time 0, and denoted L * 0,t (y) := 1 y L * t (y).
The marginal utility pricing rule becomes the "market pricing" of some modied pay-
The extension of the pricing rules to any date in the future is straightforward, using the conditional expectation, and the relative state price
Wealth sensitivity analysis By Corollary 2.2, the volatility of L * 0,t (y) is the regular volatility random eld υ * ,⊥
Its sensitivity in y is given by
The second equality uses the orthogonality of the vectors υ * ,⊥ s (y) and η R s .
The remarkable property is that
is a martingale under the probability measure with density martingale Λ * 0,t (y) = exp( 
a) The sensitivity of the zero-coupon bonds with respect to their maturity is interpreted in any yield market as a forward rate, that is the instantaneous short rate for an operation starting in the future at time T . Then, we make the distinction between market or indierence forward rate
The yield curve at current date t is the function,
b) The sensitivity of the bonds with respect to the initial wealth at the current date t is
− For the mixing of the bonds, the non normalized coecients Y * ,θ
t (y θ ) (having the common factor Y 0 t ) can be replaced by the martingales L * ,θ t (y θ ) without change after renormalization.
All these results are gathered in the next proposition:
Proposition 4.1. In an aggregate economy, (i) The marginal utility bond curve B * t (T, y) is a normalized mixture of individual bond curves, based on the martingales L * ,θ t ,
(ii) The marginal utility spot forward rates f * t (T, y) is a normalized mixture of individual spot forward rates curve based on the martingales Y * ,θ
(4.4)
Indierence Bonds pricing for power utilities We come back to the framework of aggregate power utilities, that will be used in the forthcoming numerical application in Section 4.2. We consider N agents with consistent power utilities characterized by their relative risk aversion parameters θ 1 < · · · < θ N , as studied in Paragraph 2.2.2. Then, their optimal state prices Y * ,θ t (y) are linear in y with coecientȲ * ,θ t , and the individual price of zero-coupon bonds with maturity T does not depend on y and more generally,B * ,θ t (T ) = E Ȳ * ,θ t,T |F t . The aggregate indierence zero-coupon pricē B * 0 (T, y), computed at time 0 for simplicity, is given bȳ
y θ i (y) = u x (x) and for power utilities, y θ i (y) = u θ i x (α i x) = (α i x) −θ i . Asymptotic behavior Using the linearity of the optimal state prices Y * ,θ t (y θ i ) in y θ i and the form of the marginal initial power utilities u θ i x , the asymptotic behavior of the aggregate zero-coupon price, for y around 0 (respectively ∞), is straightforward and relies on the convergence of the random measure This means that, when the wealth tends to innity, the aggregate zero-coupon price converges to the one priced by the less risk averse agent, whereas when the wealth tends modication has an impact on the innite rate, that becomes R * ,θ
The new yield curve is now:
The same kind of equation holds for the dierent forward rates. In particular the spread between the indierence curve and the market curve is given by:
Agreggate bond curve For the aggregate bond curve, we consider the aggregation of three agents with power utility and risk aversion parameter (θ i ) and with a given initial repartition of the wealth (α i ) (see Section 3.2.1). In this case, the zero-coupon bond is evaluated as
where x and α stand here to remind that the aggregate price depends on the initial wealth and on the initial choice of the parameters (α i ).
The ratio
is particularly simple, using the notation ζ 2 (T −t) = σ 2
Simulations The following simulations are provided taking υ * ,θ = θυ * for some given constant υ * . For any θ, the individual yield curve δ → R * ,θ 0 (δ) does not depend on the wealth and is a Vasicek curve with innite rate R * ,θ 0 (δ) = R 0 0 (δ)−σ 2 θυ * 1−e −aδ −aδ a 2 δ . In the gures we choose the following numerical values for the parameters r 0 = 5%, a = 1, b = 0.2, σ 1 = 20%, σ 2 = 15%, η = 20%, υ * = 80%.
It provides a standard increasing yield curve, but Vasicek model can also achieve others forms of curve (not monotonic and with bumps) for other parameters values.
In Figure 1 we draw the individual yield curve R * ,θ 0 (δ) of each class (Vasicek yield curves), for dierent values of θ. loc . As in Kunita [Kun97] , we are concerned with the regularity of G (the regularity of its local characteristics (φ, ψ) being given) and conversely with the regularity of (φ, ψ) (the regularity of G being given). Theorem 3.1.2, Theorem 3.1.3 and Theorem 3.3.3 in [Kun97] give the dierential rules (term by term) of the dynamics of an Itô random eld and the minimal condition to apply Itô-Ventzel's formula. Theorem 5.3 (Flows property of SDE). We consider the SDE(µ, σ) dX t = µ(t, X t )dt + σ(t, X t ).dW t , X 0 = x. b) The local characteristics of X, λ X (t, x) = µ(t, X t (x)) and θ X (t, x) = σ(t, X t (x)) have only local properties and belong to K 
